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THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ISRAEL'S 1982 INVASION
INTO LEBANON
On June 6, 1982, Israeli armed forces swept into southern Leb-
anon in an invasion of unprecedented magnitude.' The long ex-
pected invasion' was the epilogue of deep-rooted tensions and
hostilities between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO).3 For months prior to the invasion, Israel had expressed
concern over a PLO arms build-up in southern Lebanon.4 The Is-
raeli army had also massed its troops along Israel's northern border
with Lebanon. 5 The final act which triggered the Israeli invasion
occurred on June 4, 1982, when Palestinians in London staged an
assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador to Great Britain.6
Israel blamed the PLO for this attack, but the PLO denied responsi-
bility.7 The following day Israel's air force and artillery fired upon
1. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1982, at Al, coil.
2. No one was surprised by the Israeli action. Based on United States intelligence
reports and analytical news stories, it was speculated that it "would be a matter of time
before Israel would be forced, in her view, to act to protect her security interests." The Situa-
tion in the Middle East. Hearing before the Comm. on Foreign Relations United States Senate,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (July 15, 1982)(statement of Richard Allen, Former National Secur-
ity Advisor) [hereinafter cited as Senate I]. See also the statement of United Nations Lieut.
Gen. Callaghan, infra note 227.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 18-54. There are many Palestinian groups within
the Palestinian movement. The principle groups include: PLO, Al-Fatah, PLA, PLF, PFLP,
PDF, PFLP-GC and Al-Sa'iqua. In addition, there are many smaller splinter groups affili-
ated with these larger groups. See D. HOWLEY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PALESTINI-
ANS 135 (1975). For the purposes of this article, the name "PLO" will be used to represent
all of those Palestinian groups who are involved in the Arab-Israel conffict. This in no way
implies that the PLO was responsible for all Palestinian actions against Israel.
4. On March 2, 1982, Secretary Haig informed the United States Committee on For-
eign Affairs of an introduction of additional arms on the part of the PLO into southern
Lebanon. Developments in the Middle East, March 1982.- Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Europe and the Middle East of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1982)(statement of Peter D. Constable, Deputy Assis. Sec.) [hereinafter cited as House I]. In
regard to the arms build-up, Mr. Constable stated: "Our position is that there have been
additional arms brought into Lebanon . . . . [A]nything that threatens the stability of the
cessation of hostilities is something that has to concern us. It concerns the Israelis, too, and
we share that concern." Id. at 5.
5. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1982, at Al, col. 4.
6. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1982, at AI, col. 1. See also Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Lebanon and the Prospects for Peace in the Middle East I (Comm.
Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as Comm. Print].
7. The four assailants actually were not members of the PLO. However, the Lebanese
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PLO bases and arms depots in the Beruit area' and southern Leba-
non.9 The PLO, in turn, shelled Israeli settlements.'" Within
twenty-four hours, Israel sent its forces into Lebanon. II
The initial goals of Israel's invasion were to push the PLO out
of range of Israel's northern settlements and to establish a twenty-
five mile "buffer zone" along the Lebanese-Israeli border.12 Israel
views its actions as a legitimate act of self-defense in response to:
(1) PLO shelling of northern Israeli settlements, (2) anti-Israeli at-
tacks launched from PLO bases in Lebanon and (3) the imminent
threat to Israeli security and well-being posed by the growing stock-
pile of PLO weapons into southern Lebanon. 1' The PLO claims
that the goal of Israel's invasion was to destroy the Palestinian
movement for an independent Palestinian State.'
4
The Lebanese government has been unable to govern the ac-
tions of the PLO based in its territory. For years the Lebanese gov-
ernment has been unable to control or prevent reciprocal attacks
between Israel and the PLO.15 Lebanon characterized Israel's inva-
sion as a violation of its territorial sovereignty and called for the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese soil.' 6 The United
Nations Security Council also called for Israel to withdraw its
forces from Lebanon and for the cessation of all hostilities.17
Revolutionary Armed Faction, a Palestinian group based in Lebanon, claimed responsibil-
ity. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1982, at A10, col. 3.
8. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1982, at A9, col. 1. The bulk of the PLO's elite forces were
located in and around Beruit. See Tucker, Lebanon. The Casefor the War, COMMENTARY,
Oct. 1982, at 20.
9. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1982, at A8, col. 2.
10. Comm. Print, supra note 6, at 2.
11. Id.
12. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1982, at Al, col. 5.
13. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Division, Briefing 342/18.7.82/
3.10.108 (copy on file with the California Western International Law Journal.)
14. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1982, at A18, col. 5.
15. Cooley, The Palestinians, in LEBANON IN CRISIS 30 (P. Haley & L. Snider eds. 1979).
16. N.Y. Times. June 7, 1982, at A14, col. 6. Despite this official position, many Leba-
nese civilians welcomed Israel's invasion as an end to the PLO presence in Lebanon. On a
visit to Lebanon after the invasion, U.S. Rep. Charles Wilson stated that he was surprised by
the welcome the Israelis received from both the Lebanese Christians and Muslims. See De-
velopments in the Middle East, July 1982: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Europe and the
Middle East of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as House II].
17. Security Council S/Res/509 (June 6,1982) 2375 meeting (copy on file with the Cali-
fornia Western International Law Journal).
The Security Council . . . [g/ravely concerned at the situation as described by the
Secretary General in his report to the Council, reaffirming the need for strict respect
for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political boundaries, (1) Demands that
Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the interna-
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The claims of Israel, Lebanon and the PLO regarding the June
6 invasion involve several legal concepts, particularly State respon-
sibility, the use of force, and self-defense. This Comment will ex-
plore the interplay of these concepts raised by Israel's invasion of
Lebanon. Initially, the historical background of the Palestinian-Is-
raeli conflict will be presented, followed by a more detailed analysis
of the conflict in Lebanon. Lebanon's responsibilities for the ac-
tions of the PLO forces based in its territory will also be examined.
Following this discussion, Israel's claims to justifiable reprisal and
direct self-defense will be outlined. This section will focus on the
legitimate exercise of forceful self-defense in response to certain
types of aggression and armed attacks. Self-defense against an an-
ticipated threat will then be examined. First, a restrictive interpre-
tation of direct self-defense will be compared with anticipatory self-
defense. Second, the requirements for legitimate anticipatory self-
defense will be reviewed and interpreted. Finally, this Comment
will propose possible solutions to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
in Lebanon.
I. THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT
A. A General Historical Background
In 1947 the United Nations voted to partition British Mandate
Palestine into two separate States: Israel (to be a Jewish State) and
Palestine (to be an Arab State). 8 The United Nations adopted the
partition plan after the Arabs and Jews in Palestine failed to col-
laborate to form a unitary State.' 9
The plan was designed to alleviate the tensions and hostilities
between the Arabs and Jews. The plan was considered to be the
best resolution of the otherwise irreconcilable national aspirations
of the Jews and Arabs.20 The Arab countries opposed any partition
of Palestine. The Arabs claimed that the United Nations was not
legally competent to decide the fate of Palestine or to give the mi-
tionally recognized boundaries of Lebanon; (2) Demands that all parties observe
strictly the terms of Paragraph I of Resolution 508 (1982) which called on them to
cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and
across the Lebanese-Israeli border; (3) Calls on all parties to communicate to the
Secretary General their acceptance of the present resolution within 24 hours; (4)
Decides to remain seized of the question.
18. T. FRASER, THE MIDDLE EAST, 1914-1979, at 41 (1980). The Mandate was the re-
sult of Britain's victory in World War 1.
19. British Cabinet discussion on the final attempt to secure an agreed solution for Pal-
estine, Feb. 7, 1947, CAB 128/9 18(1947), reprinted in T. FRASER, supra note 18, at 47.
20. T. FRASER, supra note 18, at 45-47, 60-61.
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nority Jewish population "special or preferential rights or status. ' 2 1
The United Nations voted for the partition plan in November
1947, and Israel declared its independence in May 1948. Immedi-
ately a war ensued between Israel and several Arab countries.
22
One year later, armistice agreements were signed between Israel
and most of these Arab countries. 23 As a result of this war, the area
which would have comprised Arab Palestine under the partition
plan instead became subject to Jordanian and Egyptian control.
24
In June 1967 Israel and its neighboring Arab States again went
to war. Within six days Israel seized and occupied the West Bank
from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt.25 As a result of the
1948 and 1967 wars, the Palestinians never gained control of the
territory which was to be their State.
A solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict appeared in reach
in 1978 when Israel and Egypt signed a comprehensive peace
agreement. 26  This agreement called for full autonomy for Pales-
21. On Sept. 7, 1947, Jamal Bey Hussein of the Arab Higher Committee before the Ad
Hoc Committee on Palestinian Arab reactions to the UNSCOP proposals of partition in a
speech said:
Regarding the manner and form of independence for Palestine, it was the view of
the Arab Higher Committee that that was a matter for the rightful owners of Pales-
tine to decide. Once Palestine was found to be entitled to independence, the United
Nations was not legally competent to decide or to impose the constitutional organi-
zation of Palestine, since such action would amount to interference with an internal
matter of an independent nation.
Id. at 5 1. For the complete speech see id. at 49-5 i.
22. The day after Israel's independence was proclaimed, the armies of Egypt, Trans-
jordan (today Jordan), Syria, Iraq and Lebanon attacked Israel. Their aim was the creation
of a unitary Palestinian State. Id. at 65, 68-70.
23. Egypt signed an armistice in January 1949; Lebanon on March 23, 1949; Jordan on
April 3, 1949; and Syria on July 20, 1949. Iraq did not sign an armistice with Israel. Id. at
65.
24. Id. at 65-66.
25. This war was the result of years of hostilities between Israel and neighboring Arab
countries. In 1967 Syria and the Soviet Union warned Egypt that Israel had massed troops
along the Syrian-Israeli border. Although this claim was never substantiated, Egypt sent
forces into the Sinai desert, a large area bordering Israel in the south. A United Nations
peacekeeping force was stationed in the Sinai, between Israel and Egyptian forces. This
peacekeeping force was established in 1957 after Israel and Egypt had gone to war in 1956.
President Nasser of Egypt ordered the withdrawal of this peacekeeping force. Following the
United Nations withdrawal, Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, an international waterway
leading to Israel's southern port of Eilat. Israel considered this action to be an act of aggres-
sion. On May 26, 1967, Egypt proclaimed its readiness for a confrontation with Israel.
Egypt, Syria and Jordan formed an alliance, seeking to establish an independent Arab State
in Israel. On June 5, 1967, Israel staged a preemptive strike against Egypt and Syria. Two
days later, Jordan joined in the war against Israel. Id. at 97-98.
26. Id. at 148.
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tinians living on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.27 Most Palestini-
ans, however, rejected the agreement and claimed that it
contradicted the rights of the Palestinian people.28
B. Historical Background of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in
Lebanon
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict in Lebanon has been raging
since 1948.29 The 1948 war compelled thousands of Palestinians to
relocate in Lebanon and other Arab states.30 The dislocated Pales-
tinians sought an identity, and in 1964 the PLO formed and de-
clared itself the official representative of the Palestinian people.
3'
The aim of the PLO was to provide the Palestinian people with a
homeland. This homeland was to be located in all of what was
Palestine under the British mandate, that is, Israel, the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip.32 In 1968 the PLO adopted a revised version of
a Palestinian National Charter.33 The Charter called for a Palestin-
ian State which would be achieved through "the liberation of
Palestine.
' 34
In 1969 an agreement was reached between the Lebanese gov-
ernment and the PLO. This agreement, known as the Cairo Agree-
ment, permitted the PLO to use Lebanese territory as a base for
military operations against Israel.35 One year later these bases were
27. The agreement states in part: "In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants,
under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will
be withdrawn [from the West Bank and Gaza Strip] as soon as a self-governing authority has
been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing [Israeli] military
government." Id. To date, however, Palestinian autonomy has not been obtained.
28. Proclamation of the Steadfastness Front, Damascus, Syria, Sept. 23, 1978, art. 7,
reprinted in T. FRASER, supra note 18, at 176-78.
29. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
30. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1982, at A7, col. 1. About 97,000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon
in 1948. See T. FRASER, supra note 18, at 80.
31. T. FRASER, supra note 18, at 112.
32. See PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER (1968). Article I states: "Palestine is the
homeland of the Palestinian Arab people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland." Id.
Article 2 states: "Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British mandate, is an
indivisible territorial unit." Id. For the full text, see T. FRASER, supra note 18, at 120-22.
33. An earlier Charter was written in 1964. After the Arab defeat in 1967, however, the
Palestinians believed that only by Palestinian efforts would the Palestinian cause succeed. T.
FRASER, supra note 18, at 112.
34. Article 9 of the Palestinian National Charter states: "Armed struggle is the only
way to liberate Palestine. . . .The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determina-
tion and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular
revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it." Id. at 120.
35. Cooley, supra note 15, at 29-31.
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expanded after Jordan forcefully expelled the PLO from Jordanian
territory.3 6 As a result, the PLO established its main bases in Beruit
and reinforced its bases in southern Lebanon.37 These acts gener-
ated a series of border attacks and counterattacks by Israel and the
PLO.38
After years of sectarian hostilities, civil war erupted between
the Lebanese Christians and the Lebanese Muslims, who were sup-
ported by the Palestinians. 39 In an effort to quell the fighting, an
Arab peacekeeping force, comprised primarily of Syrians, entered
Lebanon in 1976.40 This attempt to end the Lebanese civil war
proved unsuccessful.4 ' By 1978 the Lebanese government and
army had so deteriorated that their continued existence became
doubtful.42
The largest Israeli action in Lebanon occurred in 1978 after a
group of PLO fighters crossed into Israel from Lebanon.43 In an
effort to prevent further PLO incursions, Israel invaded southern
Lebanon. The Israeli objective was to push the PLO forces north of
the Latini River and establish a buffer zone between the PLO and
Israel." A month later, pursuant to a United Nations agreement,
Israel agreed to withdraw from Lebanon.4 5 This agreement estab-
lished a United Nations peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon.46
This force was to police the area and prevent the return of the PLO
forces to southern Lebanon.47 However, the United Nations force
failed to stabilize the area, and the PLO soon returned and reestab-
lished its bases in southern Lebanon.
36. Jordan expelled the Palestinians when they threatened to establish a rival govern-
ment and overthrow the government of King Hussein. Id. at 228-29.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 33-36.
40. Rabinovich, The Limits of Military Power. Syria's Role, in LEBANON IN CRISIS 71-
73. (P. Haley & L. Snider eds. 1969). See also N.Y. Times, June 12, 1982, at A7, col. 2.
41. Rabinovich, supra note 40, at 71-73.
42. Cooley, supra note 15, at 51.
43. Id.
44. Snider, Haley, Wagner & Cohen, Israel, in LEBANAON IN CRISIS 98 (P. Haley & L.
Snider eds. 1979) at 98. The Latini River is about 15 miles north of the Lebanese-Israeli
border.
45. Id. at 103-06.
46. 33 U.N. SCOR. Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1978) art. 2(b), U.N. Doc. S/12611 (1978). "The
[United Nations] Force will confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international
peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effec-
tive authority in the area [southern Lebanon]." Id. See also Snider, Haley, Wagner & Co-
hen, supra note 44, at 103-06.
47. U.N. SCOR Supp. supra note 46, art. 2(d). "The Force will use its best efforts to
prevent the recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area of operation (southern Lebanon)
will not be utilized for hostile activities of any kind." Id See also N.Y. Times, June 9, 1982,
at A18, col. 3.
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Hostilities between Israel and the PLO continued. A cease-fire
was negotiated in July 1981 with the aid of the United States.48
The cease-fire specifically called for the termination of all hostilities
along the Lebanese-Israeli border.49 Israel, however, interpreted
the cease-fire to apply to anti-Israeli attacks throughout the
world." During the cease-fire, hostilities periodically erupted and
tensions increased. The PLO brought more arms into southern
Lebanon and reinforced its bases.51 Israel attacked PLO bases and
repeatedly sent its troops to the Lebanese border.52
By the spring of 1982, the United States and Israel were con-
cerned that the PLO arms build-up in southern Lebanon might
provoke Israel to attack PLO bases.5 3 Tensions increased, and on
June 6, 1982, the Israeli army, navy and airforce stormed into
southern Lebanon. The immediate result was the destruction of
PLO military bases and arms depots as well as the seizure of several
Lebanese villages and towns.
54
The Israeli-PLO hostilities in Lebanon are unusual. Israel did
not invade Lebanon to fight the Lebanese government. Instead, it
sought to vanquish the PLO from Lebanese soil. From an interna-
tional perspective, however, Lebanon's role in the Palestinian-Is-
raeli conflict must be examined with regard to the doctrine of State
responsibility.
II. LEBANON'S STATE RESPONSIBILITY
Under the principles of international law, each State has the
48. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1982, at A14, col. 6; see also Security Coucil Resolution S/Res/
490 (July 21, 1981) 2293 meeting (copy on file with California Western International Law
Journal).
49. House I, supra note 4, at 3.
50. N.Y. Times, June 7, at Al, col. 6.
5 1. When asked whether the arms build-up was a violation of the July 1981 cease-fire,
Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary stated: "The cessation of hostilities language
and agreement does not address the question of build-up of weapons. Obviously, anything
that raises tensions in the area can undermine the spirit of the cease-fire, can undermine the
commitment to the cessation of hostilities and so, that in itself would be dangerous." House
I, supra note 4, at 3.
52. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1982, at AI, col. 5.
53. The Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate acknowledged
that the stockpiling of arms could have provided the Israelis with a basis for a decision to
attack. "[The] Israelis have made it clear that in the event of some act of provocation they
would respond to that [provocation]. So that there is a danger in the first instance of a
breakdown across the border toward Israel and, in that event, of an Israeli response." House
I, supra note 4, at 2.
54. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1982, at A9, col. I.
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right to political independence" and territorial sovereignty.56 The
concept of sovereignty encompasses two aspects of independence.
First, each State possesses "internal independence."57 This
principle refers to the actions of the State in regard to its own terri-
tory and its domestic laws. 58 The manner in which a State utilizes
its territory is generally not subject to international law, provided
that such use does not endanger other States. 9 Furthermore, the
domestic law of each State is considered an internal affair and is
also outside the reach of international law.6° For instance, a State
may freely alter its domestic laws to avoid internal liability. Note,
however, that the State may still be held morally responsible by the
international community. 6'
Second, sovereignty entails "external independence. '62  This
principle provides that a State has the freedom to interact with
other States. 63 Yet, a State may not unilaterally alter an interna-
tionally imposed duty, that is, the external responsibility which
each State owes to every other State.64 Hence, the right of external
independence is not absolute.
Under the principle of external responsibility, a violation of
another State's political or territorial sovereignty is a delinquency
which imposes liability upon the offending State. 65 A State is re-
quired to exercise its territorial rights in a manner duly respectful of
the equally cognizable rights of other nations.6 6 Reciprocal guar-
antees of sovereignty and territorial integrity of States thus entitle a
nation to expect that another State's exercise of territorial rights
will not cause, even indirectly, a serious danger to its security and
55. I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 255 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1948).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 254.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 256. When this use does endanger another State, internal independence
would then be subject to international law, as the State's actions are external. See also infra
text accompanying notes 62-67.
60. I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 55, at 255. This Comment does not address the legal
question of the treatment of aliens within a State's jurisdiction.
61. Id. at 287, 304-05.
62. Id. at 254.
63. Examples include the formulation of treaties and the exchange of diplomats. Id. at
255.
64. Id. at 305
65. Id. at 256.
66. Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States, 22
AM. J. INT'L L. 105-06 (1928).
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existence.67 Both Israel and Lebanon are recognized as sovereign
States by the United Nations.68 Therefore, each has international
legal obligations to respect the rights of the other.
One duty internationally imposed on a State is the prohibition
against the threat or use of force against the territorial sovereignty
of another State.69 Force may, however, be used in a legitimate act
of self-defense.70 Prior to Israel's 1982 invasion, no Lebanese army,
acting on behalf of the Lebanese government, had physically en-
tered Israeli territory. Consequently, Lebanon had notper se vio-
lated Israel's political or territorial sovereignty. However, the
international prohibition against the threat or use of force also ex-
tends to private individuals acting either independently or on be-
half of the State in which these persons are located.7 The PLO has
been based in Lebanon for many years.72 Under this analysis then,
the PLO, as a private force in Lebanon, would be prohibited to
threaten or use force against Israel.
The extent to which a State is responsible for acts harming an-
other State may depend upon who has committed the act and the
gravity of the act committed. 73 There are generally two theories to
impute responsibility to a State for a violation of an internationally
imposed duty. "Direct" 74 or "original" 75 responsibility deals with
acts of the formal or informal organs of the State. "Vicarious" 76 or
"indirect" 77 responsibility focuses on private acts which may be im-
puted to the State.
67. Id.
68. Israel was admitted into the United Nations in 1949. Lebanon was admitted in
1945.
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."
70. U.N. CHARTER art. 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security .... "
71. M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE ACTS OF PRI-
VATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES 15 (1962).
72. See supra notes 29-53 and accompanying text.
73. I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 55, at 301-07.
74. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (1966).
75. I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 55, at 301-07.
76. Id.
77. H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 199.
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A. Direct Responsibility
International law provides that acts by particular members of a
government acting within their official capacities are to be imputed
to the State.78 The State bears direct responsibility for acts commit-
ted by government officials or authorized agents which violate in-
ternational law or cause injury to another State.7 9 The State is
directly responsible whether the acts were committed willfully or
negligently."0 However, it is often difficult to determine whether
the person who ordered or committed the injurious act was either a
governmental official or an authorized agent.
The imputation of direct responsibility can be determined by
reference to international law.8 The international legal order pro-
vides guidelines to determine which persons are competent to per-
form acts which have the "same effect as the same act performed by
an individual authorized or obliged by the national law to perform
the act."'82 The United Nations Draft Articles on State Responsi-
bility provide:
The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not part of the
formal structure of the State . . . .but which is empowered by
the internal law of that State to exercise elements of the govern-
mental authority, shall also be considered as an act of the State
under international law, provided that the organ was acting in
that capacity in the case in question.83
Under these guidelines, if the PLO were considered to be an organ
of the State of Lebanon, Lebanon would incur direct responsibility
for PLO attacks or threats against Israel. For many years the Pales-
tinians, as members of the PLO, have enjoyed a relative degree of
freedom on Lebanese territory.84 In 1969 Lebanon signed the
Cairo Agreement. Although the PLO is not a part of the formal
structure of the State of Lebanon, provisions in the 1969 Cairo
78. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1977] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N art. 6, at 73,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.1 (Part 2).
79. I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 55, at 306.
80. A. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 162 (1904).
81. See I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 55, at 300-07. The issue of whether an individual has
acted as an organ of the State may also be determined through the domestic law of the State
whose act is in question. If the domestic law permits an individual to perform such an act,
then this act would be imputed to the State. If this act were to violate the territorial sover-
eignty or political independence of another State, the State whose domestic law permitted
such injurious acts would assume direct responsibility. See also H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at
196-97.
82. H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 196-97.
83. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 78, art. 7(2), at 73.
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Agreement recognized that the PLO would have the power to act as
an informal organ of the State.85 The Agreement granted the PLO
security and administrative control over Palestinian refugee camps
in Lebanon.86 Lebanon also authorized the PLO to use Lebanese
territory "for operations into Israel."87  One commentator has
noted that "in effect, the Cairo Agreement legitimized the [PLO]
armed presence in Lebanon." '88 Security and administrative and
military activities are generally acts which are authorized by gov-
ernmental authorities.89 Therefore, the Cairo Agreement may be
interpreted as legitimizing the PLO as an informal organ of the
State of Lebanon. Through the recognition of the PLO and the
grant of power to it via the Cairo Agreement, Lebanon would as-
sume direct responsibility for PLO violations of Israel's
sovereignty.
Though the requirements for direct responsibility for Lebanon
have arguably been met, international law has not historically la-
beled acts of private individuals as acts of State.9" If it can be suc-
cessfully argued that the PLO actions were not attributable to
Lebanon under the direct responsibility doctrine, Lebanese respon-
sibility might still be vicariously imputed.
B. Vicarious Responsibility
A State is vicariously responsible for injurious acts of private
persons, nationals or foreigners residing in its territory.9' Unlike
direct responsibility, where the State bears responsibility for the act
in question,92 the principle of vicarious responsibility focuses on the
State's delict, that is, the failure to prevent or punish those persons,
acting within the State's sovereignty, who commit a hostile act
against a foreign State.93
The State is obligated to prevent those within its territory from




89. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16. Clause 16 specifically states that the
Congress has the power "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, and
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."
90. See infra section II B.
91. A. HERSHEY, supra note 80, at 162.
92. H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 199.
93. Id. at 201.
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committing injurious acts against other States. 94 If the State has
failed to prevent an injurious act, the injured State is entitled to due
satisfaction-punishment of the offenders or reparations for the
harm done.9"
[SItates are obligated by general international law to prevent cer-
tain acts injurious to other States from being committed on their
territories, and if prevention is not possible, to punish the delin-
quents and force them to repair the damage caused by the delict.
Such injurious acts are, for example, . . . hostile expeditions or-
ganized in the territory of the State and directed against the terri-
torial integrity of a foreign State or intended to overthrow the
legitimate government of another State.96
The PLO has staged military operations against Israel from
Lebanon. 97 Lebanon has failed to prevent any threats or injurious
acts directed at Israel.98 Nor has Lebanon punished those persons
responsible for committing these acts. 99 Lebanon, therefore, should
be considered delinquent for its failure to satisfy its international
obligation of preventing or punishing the PLO for acting from
within Lebanese territory.
* Although Lebanon may be delinquent, it is arguably not vicar-
iously responsible for the PLO acts. Delinquency alone does not
automatically determine vicarious State responsibility. Once a
State has been found delinquent, the vicarious responsibility doc-
trine imputes State liability in one of two ways, either through fault
(cu/pa) or absolute responsibility. The fault doctrine obligates the
State to use due diligence or "the means at its disposal''1° to pre-
vent the injurious act. 01 The absolute responsibility doctrine im-
putes all liability regardless of fault to the State for any injurious
acts from its soil. 102
1. Responsibility Based on Fault. Under the fault doctrine, a
State does not automatically incur responsibility for hostile acts of
94. A. HERSHEY, supra note 80, at 162.
95. Id.
96. H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 205-06.
97. See supra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
99. Lebanon's failure to punish those who had committed injurous acts against Israel
could be attributed to Lebanon's military weakness. See infra text accompanying notes 114-
21.
100. See H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 201.
101. A. HERSHEY, supra note 80, at 162.
102. M. GARCtA-MoRA, supra note 71, at 25. See also H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 201.
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persons committed from its territory. 10 3 If the State was unaware of
such conduct,t 4 or knew but was unable'0 5 to prevent the hostile
activities, the State would not incur responsibility. °6 This view is
implicit in the Corfu Channel case. There, the court concluded that
a State's mere control over its territory does not necessarily estab-
lish State responsibility. 07 The court emphasized that a State is
liable if it knowingly permits its territory "to be used for acts con-
trary to the rights of other States."' 18 Lebanon knowingly provided
sanctuary to the PLO forces."° This knowledge is explicitly re-
vealed through the 1969 Cairo Agreement. The Agreement permit-
ted the PLO to use Lebanese territory for hostile acts against
Israel." Under the Corfu Channel analysis, therefore, Lebanon
would be vicariously responsible for knowingly allowing its terri-
tory to be used contrary to the right of Israel's territorial and polit-
ical sovereignty.
Though a State is aware of the presence of armed bands"' on
its territory, it can still avoid vicarious responsibility if it has no
power to prevent hostile acts against another State." 2 One com-
mentator stated:
[Wlhat is required is a union of knowledge of the fact and the
power to prevent it, neither one of these alone being sufficient to
implicate [the State for] the crime of another. . . . [Tjhe power
to prevent [the wrong] is always presumed, unless its lack be
103. M. GARCA-MORA, supra note 71, at 17.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 108-10.
105. W. LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 242-
43 (1979).
106. Id.
107. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
108. The court said:
It is clear that knowledge of the mine-laying cannot be imputed to the Albanian
Government by reason merely of the fact that a minefield discovered in Albanian
territorial waters caused the explosions of which the British warships were the vic-
tims. . . . It cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a
state over its territory and waters that that state necessarily knew, or ought to have
known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily knew, or
should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from other circum-
stances, neither involves primafacie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof
Id. at 18.
109. See supra text accompanying note 15.
110. Cooley, supra note 15, at 30.
111. Armed bands have been described as "irresponsible group[s] of individuals who
invade foreign territory and commit hostile acts upon persons and property by methods or in
circumstances different from those of normal warfare." M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 71, at
109.
112. W. LEVI, supra note 105, at 242-43.
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clearly established." 3
From this perspective, Lebanon's ability to prevent PLO actions
against Israel would need to be determined before Lebanon would
be vicariously responsible.
The Cairo Agreement, which permitted the PLO to use Leba-
nese territory for actions into Israel, was reluctantly signed by Leb-
anon."' Lebanon felt compelled to sign the Agreement in order to
placate the major Arab countries who supported the Palestinian
cause." -5 Subsequent to the Agreement, Lebanon unsuccessfully
tried to limit the activities of the Palestinian fighters." 6 The situa-
tion grew explosive after Jordan expelled the PLO from its territory
in 1979." 7 The PLO established new bases in Lebanon and
strengthene4 those camps already existing in southern Lebanon." 
8
Fighting between the Palestinians and Israel continued. The Leba-
nese government was divided." 9 The Lebanese Christians and
most conservatives demanded that the government prevent PLO at-
tacks against Israel. The Lebanese progressives and most Muslims
called upon the government to defend the Palestinians from Israeli
attacks. 2° The Lebanese government could not solve these con-
flicting demands. By 1975 the Lebanese Civil War erupted. The
government was paralyzed, and the army became too weak and di-
vided to restrain the PLO and other Palestinian groups.' 2 ' Al-
though Lebanon knew of the PLO on its territory, Lebanon was
simply too weak to control the PLO. This inability, therefore,
would exculpate Lebanon from vicarious responsibility under the
fault doctrine.
The responsibility-based-on-fault doctrine has been criticized
for failing to hold the State, from whose jurisdiction a hostile act
was launched, responsible for its obligation to preserve world or-
der.' 22 Some authorities view this responsibility alone as a State
113. S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO, bk. ViII, ch. VI. § 12
(D.H. & W.A. Oldfather trans. 1964).
114. Cooley, supra note 15, at 30.
115. Snider & Haley, Israel, in LEBANON IN CRISIS 92 (P. Haley & L. Snider eds. 1979).
116. Cooley, supra note 15, at 30.
117. Id.
118. Stookey, The United States, in LEBANON IN Ciusis 228-29 (P. Haley & L. Snider
eds. 1979).
119. Snider & Haley, supra note 115, at 92.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 71, at 25.
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obligation.123 Those dissatisfied with the fault doctrine have de-
manded a broader doctrine which expands the obligations and re-
sponsibilities of the State. This expansive doctrine is known as
absolute vicarious responsibility.'24
2. Absolute Vicarious Responsibility. Another established
principle of international law is that a State is liable for hostile acts
from its soil, even if these acts are caused by private individuals not
acting on behalf of the State.125 The State's mere tolerance of the
use of its territory as either a base of operations or a point of depar-
ture for incursions into the territory of another State is an interna-
tional delinquency for which the State will be held absolutely
responsible. 26 The State incurs liability if persons within its terri-
tory have in fact committed acts which threaten world peace.' 27
The State in which the hostile act developed is therefore automati-
cally responsible despite either noncomplicity or failure to prevent
the acts. 28
The application of the absolute responsibility doctrine to Leb-
anon turns on the question of Lebanon's support of dangerous ac-
tivities which could be considered hostile to Israel's political
independence or territorial sovereignty. 129 The PLO has been con-
sidered a threat to Israel's security. 130 First, the Palestinian Na-
tional Charter calls for the destruction of the State of Israel by
"armed struggle."' 3' Second, the Cairo Agreement permits the
PLO to use Lebanese territory to continue this "struggle." 32 Third,
the PLO arms build-up in southern Lebanon could be viewed as
the means to execute the PLO's stated aim of "the liberation of
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also W. LEVI, supra note 105, at 235; H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 201.
125. W. LEVI, upra note 105, at 236; see also M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 71, at 35; 1.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 55, at 126.
126. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625, 25 GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Declaration on Principles of International Law].
127. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 71, at 26.
128. W. LEVI, supra note 105, at 235.
129. See, e.g., Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. at
7, U.N. Doc. A/925 (1949). Article 7 states: "Every State has the duty to ensure that condi-
tions prevailing in its territory do not menace international peace and order." Id.
130. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 32.
132. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Palestine."' 3 3 These factors indicate the possible PLO threat or use
of force against Israel. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
states that the threat to use force is a violation of international
law.'34 A threat of force, therefore, could logically be inferred as a
hostile act against a State's sovereignty. According to the doctrine
of absolute responsibility, Lebanon is obligated to protect Israel
from hostile acts which endanger its sovereignty. 35  Lebanon,
therefore, would be strictly liable for failing to protect Israel's inde-
pendence and well-being in the international community. 36
In sum, Lebanon arguably should bear either direct or vicari-
ous responsibility for injuries to Israel caused by the Lebanese-
based PLO. Neither theory, however, has the pragmatic force to
provide security or compensation to Israel nor to justify subsequent
Israeli actions. After all, Israel was responsible for the 1982 inva-
sion of Lebanon. The invasion, however, might still be justified
under other principles of international law.
III. THE USE OF FORCE AS A REMEDY AGAINST A VIOLATION
OF A STATE'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OR
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter codifies what is gen-
erally considered as the underlying principle of the use of force in
international law: the threat or use of force by one State against
another is prohibited.'37 Furthermore, Article 2(3) provides that
States are to settle their disputes peacefully.'38 Israel used force in
the 1982 invasion into Lebanon. 39 In view of these basic princi-
ples, Israel's actions appear to be in violation of international law.
This prohibition against the use of force, however, has customarily
been restricted when the force is a reprisal 4  or in self-defense. 141
133. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
134. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
135. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 71, at 26; see also A. HERSHEY, supra note 80, at 144.
136. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 71, at 26.
137. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
138. U.N. CHARTER art 2, para. 3. "All Members shall settle their international disputes
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are
not endangered." Id.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 1i, 54.
140. W. LEVI, supra note 105, at 312.
141. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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A. The Exercise of Forceful Reprisals
Reprisals are acts of retaliation for violations of law which
caused injury to the State exercising the reprisal.'42 The State tak-
ing the reprisal usually seizes the land or property of the delinquent
State as a means of obtaining redress for the alleged wrong.
14 3
Forceful reprisals, although customarily permissible, have some-
times been abused by strong States."' Therefore, customary inter-
national law has recognized certain principles limiting the
parameters of legitimate forceful reprisals.
These limitations were emphasized in the Naulilaa case, in
which three German soldiers were killed by Portugese soldiers at
the Portugese post of Naulilaa. '45 The attack was the result of mis-
understandings between the German and Portugese soldiers. In re-
sponse German forces attacked several Portugese outposts in the
Portugese colony of Angola."4 The Tribunal which evaluated the
conflict stated that "[r]eprisals are acts of self-help by the injured
State, acts in retaliation for unredressed acts contrary to interna-
tional law on the part of the offending State."'
' 4 7
Additionally, the Naulilaa Tribunal framed the essential re-
quirements of a legitimate forceful reprisal. First, for the injured
State to make a legitimate reprisal against the offending State, there
must have been a prior illegal act. 148 Second, prior to any reprisal,
the injured State must have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain re-
dress from the offending State for the alleged violation. 149 Third,
the reprisal should not have been patently excessive, that is, dispro-
portionate to the original wrong. 5 °
Israel claims, in part, that the 1982 invasion was in retaliation
for the shooting of its ambassador in England by a Lebanese-based
Palestinian group.' 5 ' If Israel's claim is to be seen as legitimate
under customary international law, its conduct must have fulfilled
the requirements established in the Naulilaa case.
142. A. HERSHEY, supra note 80, at 343. See also J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 399
(1963) [hereinafter cited as J. BRIERLY 1963].
143. Not all reprisals are considered acts of force. Examples include embargoes and
withdrawal of diplomats in protest. A. HERSHEY, supra note 80, at 344.
144. J. BRIERLY 1963, supra note 142, at 400.
145. Id.
146. F. KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 7 (1971).
147. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW II, at 49 (1968)
148. Id. at 50.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
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First, the assassination attempt was clearly a prior illegal
act.' 52 The shooting, however, did not occur in Lebanon, but in
England.' 53 Lebanon arguably is not the offending State. Second,
even if Lebanon was considered delinquent for harboring the as-
sailants' organization, Israel invaded Lebanon before first seeking
redress for the wrong committed-the invasion occurred within two
days after the assassination attempt. 154 Israel, therefore, failed to
meet the second requirement for legitimate reprisals. Third, the re-
taliation is limited to obtaining redress for the wrong done.
155
Israel did not seek to redress the wrong, but to rid southern Leba-
non of the PLO, which was not responsible for the assassination
attempt.156 Furthermore, the invasion would clearly appear dispro-
portionate to the assassination attempt under the principle of pro-
portionality.' 57 Therefore, Israel's retaliatory action for the
attempted assassination would not be considered as a legitimate re-
prisal under customary international law.
The United Nations Charter appears to alter any customary
legitimacy for forceful reprisals. The prohibition against the use of
force' 58 and the need to settle disputes peacefully"' support the
view that retaliatory reprisals amounting to the use of force are no
longer permitted. 160  To resort to coercive or punitive measures,
even to rectify a wrong, is not considered a justifiable method for
settling international disputes. 16 Under the United Nations princi-
ples, Israel thus would be strictly prohibited from exercising any
form of retaliatory reprisal.
162
152. See, e.g., The Law of Land Warfare, U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL
(FM 27-10) sec. 111(31) (1956)(amended 1976), reprinted in J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N.
LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 691 (2d ed. 1981). "This article is construed as
prohibiting assassination ... ." Id.
153. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text. It may be argued, however, that it was
futile for Israel to seek redress due to the weakness of Lebanon's government and army. See
supra text accompanying notes 39-42, 114-21.
155. A. HERSHEY, supra note 80, at 344.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 7, 12.
157. For a discussion of proportionality, see text accompanying notes 248-60.
158. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
159. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
160. Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 126, at 128. "States have
a duty to refrain from acts of reprisals involving the use of force." Id.
161. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 71, at 123.
162. See supra note 160.
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B. Self-Defense
According to the principles of international law, every State
has the right to use self-defense.1 63 Self-defense is a right inherent
in sovereignty.'6 The essence of this right is predicated upon a
breach of a duty owed to the State claiming self-defense.'65 This
breach of duty violates substantive sovereign rights, specifically,
territorial sovereignty 166 and political independence.
67
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter expressly permits a
State to use force when exercising self-defense.16 8 Given the lan-
guage of Article 2(4), however, the international legal order desires
to limit self-defensive actions to narrow circumstances. 169 For ex-
ample, the United Nations Charter would permit a State to act in
self-defense when the delinquent State's or person's acts take the
form of aggression."'
1. Aggression by Armed Bands. Aggression is generally con-
sidered "delictual conduct which violates and endangers the right
of territorial integrity and political independence or sovereignty,
thus placing the security of the State in danger."'' The United
Nations' Definition of Aggression defines aggression as the "use of
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of another State . . 1,72 Thus, at first
glance, an act of aggression is apparently limited to an act of the
163. W. LEVI, supra note 105, at 314. See also J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 291
(1949) [hereinafter cited as J. BRIERLY 1949].
164. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
165. D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (1958).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
169. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The aim of the United Nations is to settle disputes
peacefully. Although article 51 permits the use of force if used in self-defense, the United
Nations Charter indicates that it is preferable to not utilize force. U.N. CHARTER art. 1
reads:
The Purposes of the United Nations are. . . [t]o maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conform-
ity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
Id.
170. A.V. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 63 (1972).
171. Id.
172. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 436,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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State. However, the definition of aggression has been extended to
include State support to armed bands which use force to strike into
foreign territories. t73
A State which supports or tolerates armed bands within its ter-
ritory is generally held to be an aggressor if these armed bands
either threaten or already have committed an armed attack against
another State.'74 Lebanon has given sanctuary to the PLO.'75 The
Cairo Agreement evidences Lebanon's support and tolerance of the
PLO's presence in Lebanon.'76 It is therefore arguable that Leba-
non, by permitting the PLO to use its territory for operations
against Israel, has attained aggressor status.
Under the United Nations Charter, the characterization of
Lebanon as the aggressor would, however, not necessarily support
an Israeli claim of forceful self-defense. A State may not use force-
ful self-defense unless the hostile acts of those within the State pro-
viding sanctuary also amount to an actual armed attack.' 77
2. Aggression in the Form of an Armed Attack. Article 51
states that self-defense may be lawfully exercised against an actual
"armed attack."' 78 The determination of whether operations by
armed bands would fall within this definition depends upon the in-
tensity and frequency of the hostile actions.'79 The hostile action
must attain a certain gravity to justify a forceful exercise of self-
defense.' 8 ° Israel justified its invasion in part by citing PLO incur-
173. Id. art. 3, para. g, at 143. One act of aggression is "[tihe sending by or on behalf of a
State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State. . .or its substantial involvement therein." Id.
174. A.V. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., supra note 170, at 67. A State's "support to
[and] toleration of, armed bands likely to make incursions into foreign territory engage the
international responsibility of the State amounting to an act of aggression." M. GARCIA-
MORA, supra note 71, at 144. This form of aggression, has also been referred to as "indirect
aggression." See generally M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 190-96 (1961); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
BY STATES 369-73 (1963); M. WHITEMAN, 12 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 215-33 (1971).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
176. Id.
177. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
178. Id.
179. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 278, 366
(1963).
180. Id.; see also Definition of Aggression, supra note 172. Article 2 reads: "[Tihe Secur-
ity Council may. . . conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been com-
mitted would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact
that the acts concerned or their circumstances are not of sufficient gravity." Id.
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sions into Israeli territory.18' Frontier incidents are generally con-
sidered to lack the requisite intensity.' 82 Sporadic operations by
the PLO, therefore, would not likely be within the scope of an
armed attack sufficient to justify Israel's forceful self-defense.
Israel also argued that the PLO shelling of Israeli settlements
amounted to an armed attack which did justify self-defense meas-
ures.' 83 The PLO shelling, however, occurred after Israel attacked
PLO positions in southern Lebanon. 84 Again, sporadic shelling
would not likely justify a full-scale Israeli invasion; nonetheless,
Israel initiated the shelling. It follows that, in regard to the artillery
attacks, Israel could not claim self-defense. In fact, Israel would
likely be characterized as an aggressor.
185
Although sporadic raids may not qualify as an "armed attack,"
the totality of the acts may demonstrate a systematic campaign
which might be considered an "armed attack" sufficient to justify
self-defense. 86 This totality of the acts doctrine is also known as
the Nadelstichtaktik doctrine (tactics of the needle prick).' 87 This
theory asserts that while individual "needle pricks" may not
amount to serious injury or provocation, if the totality of the "nee-
dle pricks" do, then an endangered State may respond in self-de-
fense against the source of injury or provocation.1
88
If the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is viewed as one continuous
conflict, the totality of all hostilities may be considered an "armed
attack" which has caused serious injury or provocation to Israel.
189
The attack on the Israeli ambassador could be cited as the final
"needle prick" which provoked Israel to invade Lebanon.' 90
Under the Nadelstichtaktik doctrine, this attempted assassination
would be but one link in a long chain of events. The events would
181. See supra text accompanying note 13.
182. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 179, at 366.
183. See supra text accompanying note 13.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
185. See Definition of Aggression, supra note 172, at 438. Article 2 states that "[tihe first
use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute primafacie
evidence of an act of aggression . Id. This analysis is limited to only the artillery
shelling by Israel and the PLO.
186. Blum, State Response to Acts of Terrorism, 19 JAHRBUCH FUR INTERNATIONLES
RECHT 223, 233 (1976).
187. P. WITTIG, DER AGGRESSIONSBEGRIFF IM INTERNATIONALEN SPRACHGEBRAUCH,
in SCHAUMANN, VOELKERRECHTLICHES GEWALTVERBOT UND FRIEDENSSICHERUNG 55
(1971), reprinted in Blum, supra note 186, at 233.
188. Id.
189. See supra note 53.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 6-11; see also supra note 53.
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encompass the ongoing hostilities between the PLO and Israel.' 9'
Under this analysis, the attack on the ambassador may be charac-
terized as an "armed attack" causing serious harm and provocation
to Israel. Hence, the Nadelstichtaktik analysis would arguably sup-
port Israel's claim for legitimate self-defense.
Israel also justified its invasion as a response to the PLO arms
build-up in southern Lebanon. 92 Israel viewed the build-up as an
imminent threat to its security. 193 A strict interpretation of Article
51, however, would preclude self-defense based on only a threat of
an armed attack. Article 51 only authorizes self-defense "if an
armed attack occurs."' 194 Therefore, an Israeli claim of self-defense
in response to the alleged threat of the arms build-up could not be
supported under Article 51.
Note, however, that this restrictive interpretation of Article 51
has frequently been criticized for limiting its language to permit
self-defense only in the event of an actual armed attack.' 95 Many
commentators believe that self-defense in anticipation of an armed
attack is justified.'96
C Antic~atory Self-Defense
Under the principle of anticipatory self-defense, a defending
State would not have to wait for an armed attack to occur. 197 An-
ticipatory self-defense legitimizes the recourse to force in the face of
an imminent threat of an armed attack. 198 In an era of modern
weaponry, long-range missiles and sophisticated terror tactics, it
may be considered unrealistic for an endangered State to wait for
191. See supra notes 29-53 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying note 13; see also supra note 4.
193. See supra note 4.
194. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
195. H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 72; see also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 179, at 275.
196. H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 72. Many commentators contend that a State may not
act in anticipatory self-defense. One commentator states that:
The obligations of states to refrain from threats to the peace under Article 2,
paragraph 4, and the competence of the United Nations to take action in case of a
threat to the peace under Article 39, were not intended to give a unilateral right of
military self-defense in case of such threats. For that reason, self-defense against
threats was excluded in Article 5 1, and states were explicitly obliged to submit dis-
putes or situations which they think threaten peace, to the United Nations and to
refrain from unilateral use of force ....
Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 559 (1963). See also Henkin, Force,
Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, 57 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. 147,
150 (1963).
197. 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 179, at 257.
198. Id.
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an impending armed attack to occur. 19 9
The argument supporting anticipatory self-defense is predi-
cated upon two premises. First, a restrictive interpretation of Arti-
cle 51 is inconsistent with Article 2(4). Article 2(4) prohibits not
only the use of force, but also the threat of the use of force. 21 Sec-
ond, Article 51 is inconsistent with customary international law.
20 1
1. Article 51 in Light ofArticle 2(4). Article 2(4) prohibits the
"threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State."'20 2 In order to find a violation of Arti-
cle 2(4), it is enough if there exists only a strong probability of an
armed attack.20 3
Self-defense is not a modem creation of the United Nations
Charter.2 4 The word "inherent" in Article 51 suggests that the
right of self-defense is a deeply rooted right in international law.
One view suggests that the only purpose of Article 51 was to limit
the Security Council's power over the inherent right of the State to
act in forceful self-defense. 20 5  This view is supported by the
travauxpreparatories of the Charter which stated that the recourse
to force in self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired. 2°  The
inclusion in Article 51 of the words "if an armed attack occurs" was
primarily introduced
for the purpose of harmonizing regional organizations for de-
fense with the powers and responsibilities given to the Security
Council for maintaining peace; and [the Committee] did not in-
dicate an conscious intention [by] including the words 'if an
armed attack occurs,' to put outside the law forcible self-defense
against unlawful acts of force not amounting to an armed
attack.20 7
Under this view, the right of self-defense is inherent and not limited
to armed attacks. If Article 51 is read in conjunction with Article
2(4), the strict limitation of Article 51 becomes doubtful. Conse-
quently, anticipatory self-defense would be permissible if the often-
199. H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 72.
200. J. BRIERLY 1963, supra note 142, at 417.
201. Id.
202. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
203. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
204. J. BRIERLY 1963, supra note 142, at 417.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 417.
207. Id. at 417-18; see also McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57
AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 598 (1963).
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sive acts fall within the language of Article 2(4)-"the threat or use
of force."2 8 For example, the concentration of troops or armed
bands along a border might justify the threatened State to exercise
self-defense before an attack actually occurs.20 9
It has also been argued that the word "if' in the English text of
Article 51 "was used to express an hypothesis rather than a condi-
tion."2 ' This suggests that the phrase "tf an armed attack occurs"
is merely an example, rather than a limitation, of when forceful
self-defense may be exercised.21 This interpretation is supported
by the French text of Article 51. That version was not expressed in
the form of a condition and appears to allow forceful self-defense
when the State "is the object of armed aggression. '212 Thus, an
imminent threat of an armed attack would appear to justify re-
course to self-defense. This issue was also addressed in another
event, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
In 1962 the Soviet Union moved nuclear weapons into
Cuba.213 The United States and other North and South American
countries considered these weapons a threat to national security.
214
In response to the missile deployment, the United States imposed a
defensive quarantine around Cuba to prevent the delivery of more
Soviet weapons.21 5 Although this defensive action was not forceful,
the United States declared that it would, if necessary, use armed
force to remove the threatening weapons.216 The United States
proclamation was in conformity with the 1947 Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The treaty provided for "effective
reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American
State and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of
them. 21 7 The United States and the American countries consid-
208. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
209. J. BRIERLY 1949, supra note 163, at 291.
210. J. BRIERLY 1963, supra note 142, at 419. Article 51 reads, in part: "if an armed
attack occurs." U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
211. Id.
212. The French version reads: "dans un cas oO un Membre des Nations Unies est
l'object d'une agression armee." (emphasis added). Id.
213. Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba, 47 DEP'T ST. BULL. 717
(1962), reprinted in J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 152, at 1244.
214. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 152, at 1443.
215. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515, 523 (1963).
216. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 152, at 1244.
217. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, September 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681,
21 U.N.T.S. 77 (1947) (emphasis added).
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211ered the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba to be an act of aggression.
In response to this threat, the Organization of American States
(OAS) passed a resolution. This resolution stated that the OAS
could use armed force, if necessary, in order to prevent the missile
threat from becoming active.21 9
For months prior to Israel's invasion, the PLO had moved a
large amount of arms into southern Lebanon.220  The similarity of
the PLO arms build-up in Lebanon to the Soviet arms build-up in
Cuba was noted three months before Israel's 1982 invasion.22
218. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 152, at 1244. The Department of
State Bulletin states:
[I]t was declared that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means
may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba
from extending, by force or the threat offorce, its aggressive or subversive activities
to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an
externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United
States . ..
1d. (emphasis added).
219. The OAS recommended that member States
take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force,
which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot
continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related sup-
plies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and toprevent the
missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to
the peace and security of the Continent ...
Resolution of Council of the Organization of American States, 47 DEP'T ST. BULL. 717, 722
(1962), reprinted in J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 152, at 1244-45 (empha-
sis added).
220. The exact number of weapons was not known before the invasion. However, after
the invasion, a large amount of arms were found. United States Senator Dobbs stated: "I
think [Israel] ought to take all that they found and spread it all out in an open field some-
where and let the world see it-,200 trucks, 5-ton trucks-l,200 5-ton trucks were filled with
just small arms ammunition. That is just one example of the quantities coming out of Leba-
non . . . virtually 10 times what the expected quantities were." Senate I, supra note 2, at 37.
The Israelis claim that they captured over "4,000 tons of ammunition, 140 tanks and other
military vehicles, 12,500 light weapons, 520 heavy weapons (including cannons), 360 items of
communication equipment and 800 items of optical equipment .... " Letter from Shabtai
Roseene, Israeli Ambassador at Large to the Editor of the London Times (June 30, 1982)
(discussing Israel's invasion). (copy on file with the California Western International Law
Journal.)
221. House I, supra note 4, at 10. During a Foreign Affairs Committee meeting in March
1982, the arms build-up was discussed in regard to a possible Israeli response.
Mr. Shamansky. Have you made an assessment as to the point at which it becomes
imprudent for the Israelis to refrain in the face of a significant increase in arma-
ments in southern Lebanon?
Mr. Constable. No, we have not attempted to make such an assessment.
Mr. Shamansky. Do you believe it would be possible for the Israelis to think that
such a point might be reached?
Mr. Constable. They might come to the conclusion that such a point could be
reached. I think that in our view that kind of point is not at hand that would justify
a breakdown of the [19811 cessation of hostilities.
Mr. Shamansky. But could there be, theoretically, a point at which a significant
Vol. 13
25
Gross: The Legal Implications of Israel's 1982 Invasion Into Lebanon
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1983
ISRAEL'S 1982 INVASION INTO LEBANON
There was concern that the PLO arms build-up could reach a point
of provocation equal to that of the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba.
222
This concern was later substantiated by the large amount of arms
found in Lebanon after Israel's invasion.223 According to the OAS
and the United States proclamations, an arms build-up threatening
a State's security is an act of aggression which might justify forceful
self-defense.224 Israel's invasion, therefore, could be considered a
legitimate act of anticipatory self-defense.
2. Customary Self-Defense andArticle 51. Article 51 has also
been criticized as contrary to customary international law, which
generally permits anticipatory self-defense. If an attack is immi-
nent, the threatened State is not precluded from resorting to force-
ful self-defense to protect itself "by preventive means . . . against
. .. [a] threat of attack, or preparations or other conduct from
which an intention to attack may reasonably be apprehended. ' '225
In the Corfu Channel case the court revealed that a strong
probability of an armed attack would be sufficient to support self-
defense.226 In regard to armed bands, one commentator similarly
remarked:
[11f a State has been subjected, over a period of time, to border
raids... [and] threats of a future, and possibly imminent, large-
scale attack, and to harassment of alleged belligerents . . .[the
threatened State may] use force in self-defence [sic], in anticipa-
tion of the continuation of such action .... 227
buildup could equal a serious provocation? As an illustration, take Cuba, with
rockets and missiles, vis-t-vis the United States.
Mr. Constable. There certainly is a theoretical point where one can.
Id.
222. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 218.
224. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
225. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW I, at 299 (1904), quoted in I. BROWNLIE, supra
note 179, at 257.
226. See supra note 107.
227. R. HIGGENS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLIT-
ICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 201 (1963), quoted in Blum, supra note 186, at 234.
The commander of the United Nations peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon had warned
the PLO that their actions would lead to an Israeli invasion.
I fully warned [the PLO]. . .and explained the likely Israeli Defense Force opera-
tion which would take place if the PLO persisted in actions which could in any way
be construed as a breach of the cessation of fire [of July 1981]. A breach of the
cessation of firing would probably bring an unstoppable assault in south Lebanon
for which the PLO must accept full responsibility. . . .While in no way excusing
or condoning the Israeli Defense Force invasion of Lebanon. . .it ill becomes the
PLO to complain about the situation which has now arisen and for which they must
accept responsibility as a result of their actions.
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As mentioned, Israel and the PLO have been engaged in hostilities
for many years.228 The PLO arms build-up suggested an imminent
attack against Israel. This view gains support from the Palestinian
National Charter, which advocated the continuation of hostilities
against Israel.229 The presence of PLO arms coupled with the lan-
guage of the Palestinian Charter could likely have supported
Israel's belief that an armed attack was imminent.
These views are consistent with the well-accepted Caroline
case.230 During an insurrection in Canada, the steamer Caroline
transported men and materials for the rebels into Canada from
American territory. The United States government was either un-
able or unwilling to prevent this traffic. Consequently, Canadian
militia crossed into American territory and set fire to the
Caroline 231
The United States conceded that, under certain circumstances,
Canada's actions would be legitimate.232 United States Secretary
of State Daniel Webster developed what became the generally ac-
cepted requirements for anticipatory self-defense:
[There must be shown] a necessity of self-defense, instant, over-
whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delib-
eration ... [the action must not be] unreasonable or excessive,
since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be
limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.
2 33
This case established the customary requirements for actions in an-
ticipatory self-defense: necessity and proportionality.234 Therefore,
the Israeli invasion into Lebanon would be legitimate only if neces-
sary and proportionate to the harm already suffered.
a. Necessity. The necessity of self-defense arises when either
a violation is imminent or a past violation is continued.235 Israel's
invasion has been criticized on the premise that Israel's actions
were not necessary-the June 1981 cease-fire was still essentially
Statement of Lieut. Gen. William Calaghan, June 8, 1982, reprinted in N.Y. Times, June 20,
1982, at AI0, col. 3.
228. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
230. See J. BRIERLY 1963, supra note 142, at 405.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 406.
234. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 179, at 43.
235. D. BOWETT, supra note 165, at 59.
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viable in June 1982.236 However, the application of anticipatory
self-defense is not predicated on an actual armed attack, but on the
threat of attack. The likely dangers that Israel faced from the PLO
arms build-up could justify action to remove a potential threat.
Nonetheless, Israel did not seek a peaceful solution before the
invasion. The need to attempt peaceful solutions to a conflict is
explicit in Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter.2 37 According
to customary international law, however, a State need not wait for
an armed attack to occur.238 Furthermore, Article 51 states that
self-defense may be exercised "until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and
"1239security.
The juxtaposition of customary international law with Article
51 suggests that a State may forcefully respond to an imminent
threat of an armed attack until peace and security can be achieved
by the United Nations. The State is, in the first instance, the judge
of the necessity of self-defense and may take such measures as it
feels necessary. 24 ° The American Draft of the Kellogg-Briand Pact
of 1928 proclaims that only the State is "competent to decide
whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense."24'
Consequently, the endangered State would not first be obligated to
seek peaceful resolution if the State reasonably believes that self-
defense is a pressing necessity.
Nevertheless, the United Nations considers it essential that, in
order to maintain international peace and security, parties first
peacefully negotiate their disputes.242 If a peaceful solution is pos-
sible, it is preferable to the use of force. Israel, however, may have
reasonably felt that a peaceful solution to the removal of the per-
ceived threat was unavailable. The Lebanese government was
236. Senate 1, supra note 2, at 15.
237. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 197-99.
239. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
240. Travaux-Preparatoires for the Peace Pact of Paris (The Kellogg-Briand Pact), I
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. 32 (1942), reprinted in J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N.
LEECH, supra note 152, at 1234.
241. Id.
242. U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the main-
tenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
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weak and divided.24 3 By reason of the Cairo Agreement, Lebanon
could not or would not negotiate with Israel to remove PLO weap-
ons from southern Lebanon.244 Furthermore, the 1978 United Na-
tions peacekeeping force was still stationed in southern Lebanon
during the June 1982 invasion.211 The United Nations presence
had generally proved ineffective in preventing the arms build-up.
246
Under these circumstances, a case of necessity arguably had arisen
which could justify Israel's failure to seek further peaceful
assistance.
If it is determined that Israel's invasion was necessary due to a
threat caused by the PLO arms build-up, only the first element of
anticipatory self-defense is satisfied. Proportionality, the other re-
quirement for legitimacy, must also be fulfilled.247
b. Proportionality. The customary right of self-defense re-
quires that the force used be proportionate to the illegal act or
threat. 248 The significance of this principle of proportionality is
based on the need to control a possible destructive "natural tempta-
tion" to exceed the force necessary to repel or remove the danger.249
Generally, a State may use slightly more force than the actual
precursor attack.25° A large scale invasion, however, is dispropor-
tionate to sporadic attacks.25' Consequently, infrequent PLO bor-
der incursions and artillery attacks would not justify a massive
invasion into Lebanon by Israeli forces.252
Proportionality, however, takes on an interesting character
under the Nadelstichtaktik doctrine.253 If sporadic raids are viewed
in a broader context, intervention through self-defense may then be
permitted to remove the danger to a State's security. One commen-
tator has stated:
[A] State that is subject to continual harassment. . . could legiti-
mately strike against the base-camp or center of organization of
243. See supra text accompanying notes 114-21.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
245. See e.g., Security Council S/Res/511 (June 18, 1982) (copy on file with the Califor-
nia Western International Law Journal).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 232-34.
248. See supra text accompanying note 233.
249. J. BRIERLY 1949, supra note 163, at 292; see also H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 82.
250. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 179, at 264.
251. Id.; see also text accompanying notes 178-86.
252. Blum, supra note 186, at 235; see also text accompanying notes 178-85.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
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the raids even though this attack might necessarily be on a much
larger scale than each individual raid, or even than the sum total
of the raids. The object to be achieved is the prevention of raids
in the future or a reduction in their number and effectiveness.
254
Israel and the PLO have been engaged in continuous con-
flict.2 5 The PLO's use of force against Israel usually took the form
of border incursions and sporadic artillery shelling.256 Israel's inva-
sion was massive, consisting of tanks, sophisticated airplanes and
warships.2 57 This invasion was clearly on a much larger scale than
the PLO actions. However, such an invasion might be justifiable.
Israel's objective was to prevent further hostilities and an allegedly
imminent PLO attack.258 Hence, under the Nadelstichtaktik analy-
sis, Israel's invasion could legitimately be characterized as
proportionate.
Proportionality is difficult to assess when confronted by only a
threat. It has been argued that, while under threat, self-defense
should be limited to repelling the danger.259 However, the limited
purpose of self-defense does not preclude interpreting proportional-
ity to permit the removal of the danger which initially warranted
the self-defensive action.26° Consequently, Israel's attempt to re-
move the PLO from southern Lebanon could be viewed as propor-
tionate until the threat was actually removed.
Under a narrow interpretation of Article 5 1, Israel's invasion
could be determined excessive and therefore illegitimate. However,
if the Palestinian-Israeli conflict were viewed as one continuous
conflict, Israel's invasion would then appear proportionate and rea-
sonable under the Nadelstichtaktik doctrine.2 6' Israel would thus
be justified in removing the threat to its political and territorial sov-
ereignty posed by the PLO.
254. D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 678 (1970), quoted in Blum, supra note 186, at 235.
255. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text.
256. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1982, at AI, cols. 4, 6.
257. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1982, at A9, col. 1.
258. Senate I, supra note 2, at 12.
259. H. KELSEN, supra note 74, at 82.
260. This issue of proportionality was raised when American and North Vietnamese
forces clashed in 1964 off the Gulf of Tonkin. American forces claimed that North Vietnam
made two attacks on American naval vessels in international waters. After the second attack,
American air strikes destroyed North Vietnamese bases and supporting facilities. In this
situation, the principle of proportionality was interpreted to allow removal of the danger
which provoked the act of self-defense. Id., at 82 n. 74.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 186-91.
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION
The foundational principles of international law evidence a
desire to maintain peace and security in the world community.262
Previous attempts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have
failed to eradicate the hostilities. The achievement of peace and
security logically lies in long-term solutions to the Palestinian-Is-
raeli conflict. These objectives can be realized by reciprocal respect
for the rights of Lebanon, Israel, and the PLO.
Any legal solution must encompass the legal rights of all the
parties involved. First, Lebanon's sovereignty must be restored.
Second, Israel's security interests as a sovereign in the international
community must be protected. Third, the Palestinian right of self-
determination, as guaranteed by Article 1(2) of the United Nations
Charter, must be fulfilled.263
Lebanon can be viewed as a battle zone for two foreign armed
forces, the PLO and Israel. Lebanon's irresponsibility in regard to
PLO actions against Israel can be attributed in large part to the
weakness of its government.26 Consequently, it is necessary to en-
able Lebanon to exercise its right as a sovereign entity to make it a
viable State. Sovereignty encompasses several fundamental
rights. 265 These rights include the power of a State to determine its
internal independence.266 Lebanon desires the peaceful removal of
all foreign forces from its territory.267 Therefore, the removal of all
foreign forces and the rebuilding of Lebanon would be a necessary
prerequisite for bringing stability to the region.
As discussed, Israel's June 1982 invasion of Lebanon was a
legitimate act of anticipatory self-defense. Self-defense is predi-
cated on a State's right to remove an alleged danger to the State.
268
Once this danger is removed, the necessity for the continuation of
the self-defensive action ends. Israel's invasion removed the PLO
from southern Lebanon.2 69 If Israel's claim of proportionality is to
262. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1. For text see supra note 169.
263. U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 2. This article states that the purposes of the United
Nations include "the principle of equal rights and self-determination." Id.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 114-20.
265. Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 126, at 128. This reads:
"All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties . I..." d.
266. "Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic
and cultural systems." Id.
267. House II, supra note 16, at 24.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 250-60.
269. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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remain legitimate, Israel must withdraw its forces from southern
Lebanon. Furthermore, the United Nations Security Council has
called for Israel's withdrawal from Lebanese territory.27 ° Israel
claims that if it were to withdraw from Lebanon, as in 1978,27 1 its
security and well-being would again be threatened. 2  This argu-
ment is supported by the past failures of the United Nations
peacekeeping force to stabilize southern Lebanon.273
The return of the PLO to southern Lebanon can be resolved by
satisfying the Palestinian's right to self-determination. Self-deter-
mination is the right of a people to freely determine their own polit-
ical, social, cultural and economic status.274 Article 1(2) expressly
emphasized this right of self-determination. 275 The 1968 Palestin-
ian National Charter, however, calls for the right of self-determina-
tion and sovereignty over all of British Palestine, which includes
Israel.276 This claim would be inconsistent with Israel's right to ex-
ist as an internationally recognized State.27 7
The Palestinian right to self-determination and Israel's right to
be an independent State can be reconciled. The 1979 Egyptian-
Israeli Peace Agreement provided for full Palestinian autonomy on
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 278 Autonomy is the power to self-
govern. 279 The agreement called for the eventual determination of
the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after five years of
autonomous rule.28" Therefore, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agree-
ment provides a plausible long-term solution to the Palestinian-Is-
raeli conflict.
V. CONCLUSION
The Palestinian conflict has been raging since 1948.281 This
conflict reflects the desire of two peoples for the same parcel of land
with two names-Palestine (to the Arabs) and Israel (to the Israel-
270. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
273. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, June 9, 1982, at A18, col. 3.
274. Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 126.
275. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
276. See supra notes 32-34.
277. Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 126.
278. Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David, Sept. 17, 1978,
reprinted in T. FRASER, supra note 18, at 173; see also supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
279. FUNK & WAGNALLS' STANDARD DESK DICTIONARY 43 (5th ed. 1980).
280. See T. FRASER, supra note 18, at 173; see also supra text accompanying note 27.
281. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
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is).282 The PLO was elected as the official representative of the
Palestinian people. From their bases in Lebanon the PLO has tried
to create a Palestinian State by "armed struggle" against Israel.
283
The Israelis have been determined to prevent PLO incursions and
to remove the PLO from its bases in Lebanon.284 Thirty-five years
of fighting ongoing conflicts resulted in the June 6, 1982, Israeli
invasion into Lebanon.28 5
The Palestinians and Israelis were not the only nations in-
volved in this thirty-five year long conflict. Lebanon, primarily
since 1969, has been a significant party.286 The territorial sover-
eignty of both Israel and Lebanon has been violated: Israel's by the
PLO based in Lebanon and Lebanon's by the PLO and by the Is-
raeli invasion.287
Under international law Lebanon likely bears some responsi-
bility for the PLO actions against Israel. Lebanon is obligated to
protect Israel's political and territorial sovereignty by preventing
PLO threats or attacks against Israel from within Lebanese terri-
tory.288 Lebanon has failed to fulfill this duty.28 9 Furthermore,
Lebanon authorized the PLO to use its territory against Israel's in-
terests. 290 Therefore, Lebanon could bear direct responsibility for
those PLO actions which injure Israel.29 1
Historically, however, international law has not imputed direct
responsibility to a State for the acts of private persons. Conse-
quently, vicarious responsibility is looked to when judging a State's
liability for private acts.292 Under the fault doctrine of vicarious
responsibility, Lebanon would not incur responsibility for its in-
ability to prevent the PLO's threats and attacks against Israel.293
Under absolute responsibility, however, Lebanon would be held
282. See supra text accompanying note 18.
283. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. Israel gained its independence thirty-
five years ago in 1948.
286. In 1969 Lebanon signed the Cairo Agreement which permitted the Palestinians to
use Lebanese territory as a base of operations against Israel. See supra text accompanying
notes 29-54.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 37-54.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 78-90.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 84-90.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 78-90.
292. See supra text accompanying note 91.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 103-24.
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automatically responsible. 294 Lebanon's weakness and consequent
inability to prevent PLO actions would be irrelevant.
Israel attempted to justify its invasion into Lebanon as either a
legitimate exercise of self-defense or a reprisal. 295 However, Israel's
invasion cannot be justified as a reprisal under either customary
international law or the United Nations Charter.291 Self-defense,
on the other hand, is an inherent right protected by international
law.2 97 According to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, self-
defense would only be justified if a prior armed attack occurred
against the defending State.2 98 Sporadic attacks by the PLO are
likely not of sufficient gravity to be considered an armed attack.299
Israel's invasion, therefore, could not be justified under a strict in-
terpretation of Article 51.
Under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, however,
Israel's invasion may be justified. Those favoring this doctrine
have criticized a narrow interpretation of Article 51 . Modernly,
not only an armed attack, but a threat of an armed attack can jus-
tify a threatened State to act in self-defense.30 ' The PLO arms
build-up in southern Lebanon could be considered a sufficient
threat to warrant Israel's anticipatory self-defense.30 2 However,
Israel's actions needed to be both necessary and proportionate to
legitimize its self-defense actions.
30 3
Israel's invasion appeared necessary. The threat of an armed
attack was reasonably possible in light of the PLO arms build-up
and the provocative language of the Palestinian National Char-
ter.3" The invasion was also necessary due to the repeated failures
of the Lebanese government and the United Nations peacekeeping
force to stabilize southern Lebanon.30 5
The proportionality requirement was likely satisfied, depend-
ing on one's interpretation. Under one view, if Israel's invasion
was in response to sporadic PLO attacks, the invasion would ap-
294. See supra text accompanying notes 125-36.
295. See supra text accompanying note 13.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 142-62.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 163-67.
298. See supra notes 70, 178 and accompanying text.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 179-82.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 192-201.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 197-99.
302. See supra notes 213-24 and accompanying text.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 230-34.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 235-47.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 242-46.
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pear excessive and therefore illegitimate.3 °6 Another view, how-
ever, would support Israel's invasion as a legitimate response to
years of hostilities. 3 7  Finally, self-defense would only permit
Israel to remove the danger that arguably resulted from the PLO
arms build-up. Once this danger has been removed, Israel's action
would cease to be defensive and legitimate.30 8
Laurence M. Gross*
306. See supra text accompanying notes 248-52.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 253-58.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 259-60.
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